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Abstract—Software-defined networking offers numerous ben-
efits against the legacy networking systems through simplifying
the process of network management and reducing the cost of
network configuration. Currently, the management of failures
in the data plane is limited to two mechanisms: proactive and
reactive. Such failure recovery techniques are activated after
occurrences of failures. Therefore, packet loss is highly likely
to occur as a result of service disruption and unavailability. This
issue is not only related to the slow speed of recovery mechanisms,
but also the delay caused by the failure detection process. In
this paper, we define a new approach to the management of
fault tolerance in software-defined networks where the goal is to
eliminate the convergence process altogether, rather than speed
up failure detection and recovery. We propose a new framework,
called Smart Routing, which works based on the forewarning signs
on failures in order to compute alternative paths and isolate the
risky links from the routing tables of the data plane devices.
We validate our framework through a set of experiments that
demonstrate how the underlying model runs.
Index Terms—Software-Defined Networking, OpenFlow, fault
management, risk management, service availability.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE concern about the Internet ossification, which is aconsequence of the growing number of variety networks
(e.g. Internet of Things, wireless sensor, Cloud, etc.) that
serve a huge number of clients (currently estimated about 9
billion) around the globe, has led to rethink about the existing
rigid network infrastructure whether it can be replaced by
a programmable one [1]. In this context, Software-Defined
Networking (SDN) has emerged as a promising solution to
tackle the inflexibility of the legacy networking systems. Un-
like traditional IP networks, SDN architectures consist of two
layers: A control plane and a data plane. The control plane,
or sometimes called the controller, represents the network
brain and maintain a global view on the network. While,
the data plane comprises network forwarding elements, i.e.
switches and routers, that constitute the network topology.
All the data plane elements are dictated by the network
controller and therefore the entire nodes have to disclose their
status periodically toward the controller, hence the global view
comes. So far, OpenFlow [2] is the most widely used protocol
that enables the controller to govern the SDN data plane
through carrying the forwarding rules as well as to facilitate
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the exchanging of signals between the two planes. Nowadays,
communication networks play a vital role in human being’s
life activities as it represents the backbone for most of the
current modern technologies. Since networking equipment are
failure prone, some aspects like availability measurements,
fault management and reliability become very important. This
paper is mainly focused on the availability attribute in terms
of fault tolerance and forecasting of failure in SDNs. Despite
SDN benefits, new challenges such as recovery from failure
still require investigation in order to maximise their utility
[4], [5]. This paper presents a complementary approach that
minimises the percentage of service unavailability through util-
ising an online failure prediction mechanism. This allows the
network controller to perform the necessary reconfiguration
prior the failure incidents. Although a number of works on
SDN fault management have been proposed, none of them
has exploited the feature of SDN global view in the context
of failure prediction purposes.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section II
provides an overview of literature related to various SDN fault
management techniques. We define the problem statement in
Section III and the novelty of our work. We then present
our model and framework in Section IV. Section VII and
VIII present the experimental procedure, observed result and
comparison. Finally, a summary of this paper is provided in
Section IX with some future research directions.
II. RELATED WORK
Link failure issues often occur as part of everyday routine
network operations. Due to their negative impact on network
Quality of Service (QoS), a considerable amount of research
has been conducted to analyse, characterise, evaluate and
recover from the frequent issues of network link failures. Such
failures can either be unintentional (i.e. unplanned) due to
various causes like human error, natural disasters, overload,
software bugs or cable cuts, or intentional (i.e. planned) caused
by the process of maintenance [6]. Failure recovery is a
necessary requirement for networking systems to ensure the
reliability and service availability. Generally, failure recovery
mechanisms of carrier-grade networks are categorized into two
types: protection and restoration. In protection, which is also
know as proactive, alternative solutions are pre-planned and
reserved in advance (i.e. before a failure occurs). By contrast,
in restoration, which is also called reactive, possible solutions
are not pre-planned and will be calculated dynamically when
failures occur. Both approaches have pros and cons.
For example, the authors in [8] implemented an OpenFlow
monitoring function for achieving a fast data plane recovery.
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2In [9], another protection method was proposed through using
the OpenFlow-based Segment Protection (OSP) scheme. The
main disadvantage of these approaches is that they consume
the data plane storing capability since the more flow entries
(i.e rules) that need to be stored, the more storage space
that needs to be used. Current OpenFlow appliances in the
market are able to accommodate up to 8000 flow entries only,
due to known limitations of the Ternary Content-Addressable
Memory (TCAM), hence making this kind of solutions costly
[7], [10]. The installation of many attributes in the OpenFlow
forwarding elements could lead to the deterioration of the pro-
cess of match-and-action for the data plane nodes. Moreover,
there is no guarantee that the preserved backups are failure-
free; the backup path might fail before the primary one.
Following the restoration approach, the authors in [11] and
[12] presented OpenFlow restoration methods to recover from
single link failures. Experiments were conducted on small
scale network topologies that did not exceed 14 nodes. In
[13], the authors demonstrated, through extensive experiments,
that OpenFlow restoration is not easily attainable within a
time of 50ms, especially for large-scale networks, unless using
protection techniques. In the same context, some works have
utilised the concept of multiple disjoint paths to be employed
as a backup. For example, CORONET [14] is presented as
a fault-tolerance system for SDNs, in which multiple link
failures can be resolved. The ADaptive Multi-Path Compu-
tation Framework (ADMPCF) [15] and HiQoS [16] for large
scale OpenFlow networks were produced as traffic engineering
tools that are capable of holding two or more disjoint paths
to be utilised when some network events (e.g. link failure)
occur. Most of the existing works do not take into account the
processing time of flow entries, i.e. insert, delete and modify
of rules. Although the performance of OpenFlow devices is
associated with their vendors, in [17] the authors stated that
each single flow entry insertion ranges from 0.5ms to 10ms.
However, 11ms is the minimum duration required to modify
a single rule, since each modification process includes both
deletion (of old rules) and insertion (of new ones) [18].
Unlike existing works, the authors in [19] considered the
problem of minimising the time of flow entries required
when diverting from an affected primary path to a backup
one. Although, the presented algorithms do not guarantee the
shortest path from end-to-end, nonetheless, they open a new
direction that is worth exploring. Within the same context, the
authors in [20] produced new algorithms for minimising the
required time to update rules through reducing the solution
search space from the source to the destination in the affected
path. Similarly, in [21], an approach to divide the network
topology into non-overlapping cliques has been introduced to
tackle the issue of failures in a localised manner, rather than
taking a global view of the network. Both [20] and [21] took
into account the time required to compute the alternative route
in order to speed up the update operation. The main issue with
the last three works is that they do not guarantee a shortest
path from source to destination.
In summary, the previous studies demonstrated different
methods to tackle the problem of data plane recovery from
link failure incidents. A more recent survey [22] outlines in
detail more contributions to the area of fault management in
SDNs. One can conclude that protection approaches are not
ideal due to the TCAM space exhaustion problem, whereas the
latency issue is the major drawback of the existing restoration
approaches. As a result, we believe that more research is
needed in terms of achieving efficient SDN resilience, which
is the main aim of this work.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND CONTRIBUTIONS
Current SDN fault tolerance mechanisms inescapably lead
to a certain amount of packet loss as well as to a certain
probability of service unavailability. This is due to the delay
of the convergence scheme TC . We define TC as the time taken
by the OpenFlow controller to amend a path in response to
failure scenario. Typically, the convergence time in SDNs can
be defined in terms of three factors:
• Failure detection time (TD): This is the required time to
detect a failure incident. Compared with the conventional net-
working systems, the centralised management and global view
of an SDN eases this task by continuously monitoring network
status and obtaining notifications upon failure. However, the
speed of receiving a notification is sometimes associated with
the nature of network design and mode of communication
(i.e. in-band or out-of-band) [23], [24]. According to [25],
link failure detection time ranges from tens to hundreds of
milliseconds, depending on the type of commercial OpenFlow
switch being used.
• New route computation time (TSP): This is the spent
time when network controller runs a nominated shortest path
routing algorithm (e.g. Dijkstra [26]) to compute the backup
path (usually for the reactive fault tolerance strategies). The
TSP computation time could reach 10s of milliseconds [20]
according to how big the network is.
• Flow entries update time (TUpdate): This is the required time
to update the relevant switches (i.e. nodes who are involved
in the affected path). Again, this factor depends on how many
forwarding rules need to be updated after the failure scenario,
where the amount of time for a single rule may exceed 10ms.
Accordingly, the resulting convergence time can be calcu-
lated through the following equation:
TC = TD + TSP +
dst∑
src
TUpdate (1)
Currently, the classical SDN fault management methods
aim to tackle the failure after it occurrence, therefore, the
recovery mechanism is activated after the moment of failure
and hence all the previous work proposals embroiled in a
certain amount of delay according to (1). The only way to
completely overcome the three factors of (1) altogether is
by handling the failure before it occurs. Therefore, failure
prediction is required to provide awareness about the potential
future incidents as well as allowing the controller to perform
the reconfiguration action in purpose of overriding failures
before causing damage on some paths. Although there are
a number of studies that have put efforts in the area of
failure prediction, none of these (except [27]) has exploited the
information that can be gained from any prediction method to
3TABLE I
LIST OF NOTATIONS
Symbol Description
src Source router
dst Destination router
A Service availability
U Service unavailability
ei j Link traversing any two arbitrary routers i and j
Qptr A pointer that points to first ei j in the Queue
F Failed link set
FR Failed/affected route set
PFL Potential failed link set
PFR Potential failed route set
M Prediction alarm message
CO Network controller
TΩ Threshold of failure probability
Tω Threshold of risk
OF OpenFlow instruction
TP True positive
FN False negative
FP False positive
CC Cable cut per year
SPx Any shortest path algorithm x in terms of hops
eliminate network incidents (e.g. link failures). To the best of
our knowledge, [27] is the only realistic study that discussed
the advantages of failure prediction through producing a risk-
aware routing method for the legacy IP networks. Our work is
different from theirs in that we build a framework of proactive
failure management for SDNs. Our work combines the concept
of the online failure prediction with risk analysis towards
maximising the network service availability.
With this context in mind, we can summarise the main
contributions of this paper as follows:
• A new network model that allows for the forecasting of link
failures by predicting their characteristics in an online fashion.
This model also combines the predictive capability with the
decision making process using risk analysis.
• We provide an implementation of the new model in terms
of a couple of fault tolerance algorithms. We use simulation
techniques to test the efficiency of these algorithms. Our sim-
ulation results prove that the proposed model and algorithms
improve the service availability of SDNs.
IV. THE PROPOSED MODEL
Anticipating failures before they occur is a promising ap-
proach for further enhancement of SDN failure management
techniques, i.e. the proactive and reactive, in which the con-
troller responds to failures when they take place. The SDN
proposed model for anticipating link failure events is presented
in this section. We start by outlining some notations that
will be used throughout this paper, as shown in Table I.
The network topology is modelled as an undirected graph
G = (V, E); where V represents the finite set of vertices
(i.e. routers) in G that ranges over by {vi, vj, . . . , vz} where
{i, j, . . . , z} ⊂ {1, . . . , n} for n ∈ N , and E represents the
finite set of bidirectional edges (i.e. links) in G that denoted
as {ei j} where each ei j ∈ E is an edge that enables vi and
vj to connect each other. Now, we define the following test
operational function (OP) over a link, which reflects the link
state whether it’s working or not:
OP(ei j) =
{
1 the link is operational
0 otherwise
Therefore, F can be defined as follows:
F = {ei j | ei j ∈ E ∧OP(ei j) = 0}
Based on G, we define a path P as a sequence of vertices
representing routers in the network. Each path starts from a
source router, src, and ends with a destination router, dst:
P = (src, . . . , dst)
We define the set Flow to represent all demand traffic flows
that need to be serviced. Each f low ∈ Flow is an instance of
P, which associates with a particular traffic that are defined
by unique src and dst pair. We consider f lowset to be the
set of all the possible paths between src and dst that can be
derived from G, which is defined as follows:
f lowset = {P | (first(P) = src) ∧ (last(P) = dst)}
and the definition of first and last is given as functions on
any general sequence (a1, . . . , an):
first((a1, . . . , an)) = a1, last((a1, . . . , an)) = an
We also consider Pset as a set that contains all the admissible
paths that can be constructed from G, so this means that
P ∈ Pset and therefore, Flow ⊂ Pset . When a link failure
is reported in G, then, we identify the affected routes as follow:
FR = { f low | f low ∈ Flow ∧ ∃vi,vj .vi, vj ∈
f low ∧OP(vi, vj) = 0}
In the same context, but this time we consider the case of
when there is a link failure prediction message mi ∈ M such
that M set denoted by {mi}ni=1 where each mi ∈ M is defined
as mi = (e¯i j, t), where t is the time when the system receives
mi . In this context, we define the following:
PFL = {e¯i j | e¯i j ∈ E ∧ ∃mi .mi = (e¯i j, t) ∧ mi ∈ M}
to characterise the received link, which we use e¯i j to imply
that ei j ∈ PFL is a shorthand, with state of potential to fail
and hence it does not belong to F. Now, we can define the
potential to fail route set as follows:
PFR = { ¯f low | ¯f low ∈ Flow ∧ (∃e¯i j .e¯i j ∈ ¯f low ∧ e¯i j ∈
PFL)}
where ¯f low is a f low that has at least one e¯i j , in other words,
¯f low ∩ PFL 6= ∅.
A. SDN Predictive Model
All the previous efforts that dealt with data plane failures
have succeeded in mitigating the impact of failures (e.g.
4reduce the downtime) rather than attempting to obviate their
effect, such as the service unavailability. Network incidents
that cause routing instability, i.e. flaps, and lead to significant
degrading of network service availability vary [28], [29],
however, we are merely concerned with the type of data
link failure. By relying on monitoring techniques, some
failures can be predicted through failure tracking, syndrome
monitoring, and error reporting [30]. Consequently, a set
of conditions can be defined as a base to trigger a failure
warning when at least one of the predefined conditions is
satisfied, as follows:
if
〈
condition
〉
then
〈
warning trigger
〉
Online failure prediction strategies vary such as machine
learning techniques (e.g. using the κ-nearest neighbor algo-
rithm [31]) and statistical analysis methods (e.g. time series
[30], Kalman and Wiener filter [32]). Such techniques can be
used to predict the incoming events through relying on the
past and current state information of a system. However, in
this paper, we do not intend to propose a failure prediction
solution as extensive studies have been conducted in this field
with remarkable achievements. Instead, employing the online
failure prediction as a technique to enrich the current SDN
fault management is one of the main aims of this work.
A generic overview of the time relations of online failure
prediction is presented in Figure 1.
Fig. 1. Online failure prediction and time relations [30].
• ∆td: represents the past (historical) data upon which the
predictor is forecasting the upcoming failure events.
• ∆tl: represents the lead time upon which a failure alarm is
generated. It can also be defined as the minimum duration
between the prediction and failure.
• ∆tw: represents the warning time in which an action may
be required to find a new solution based on the predicted
event. Therefore, ∆tl must be greater than ∆tw so that the
information from prediction will be serviceable. In SDN,
the ∆tw should be at least adequate to the time required
to set up the longest shortest path in given G.
• ∆tp: represents the time for which the prediction will
be assumed to be a valid case. This should be defined
carefully by the network operator so as to identify the
true and false alarms after a certain time window.
The quality of the failure prediction is usually evaluated by
two parameters: FP and FN; whereas, Recall and Precision
are the two well-known metrics that are used to measure the
overall performance.
Recall =
TP
TP + FN
, Precision =
TP
TP + FP
(2)
Recall is defined as the ratio of the accurately captured
failures to the total number of the certainly occurred failures.
However, Precision is defined as the ratio of the correctly clas-
sified failures to the total number of the positive predictions.
Correspondingly, SDN controller actions will now associate
with predicted and unpredicted situations as listed in Table II.
TABLE II
CONTROLLER ACTIONS BASED ON PREDICTION
Prediction Action
TP Select an alternative route
FP Unnecessary/needless action
FN Call the standard failure recovery
On one hand, every false failure alarm will lead to an un-
necessary reconfiguration for a particular set of routes in Flow
and this will cause unwitting network instability. On the other
hand, a controller needs to deal with the undetected failures in
a similar way to the classical methods. Consequently, the more
precise behaviour of prediction, the higher the percentage of
network stability and service availability will be gained. The
relevance between the network model and the predictive model
is summarised in Figure 2.
FR PFR
FN FPTP
FR ∩ PFR
Fig. 2. Relation between prediction and failure sets
B. Failure Event Model
We have implemented an approach of generating failure
events as it is very difficult to find a public network dataset that
includes some useful details like failures, hence, we adopted
an alternative approach by developing our failure model.
This work intends to enhance the SDN fault tolerance and
resilience through maximising the network service availability.
Two basic metrics have been exploited in this model: Mean
Time Between Failure (MTBF) and Mean Time To Recover
(MTTR); which are essential for calculating the availability
and reliability of each network repairable component [3],[33].
MTBF is defined as the average time in which a particular
component functions before failing, where it comes through:∑(startdown time−startup t ime )
number of f ailures ; while, MTTR is the average
time required to repair a failed component. Each component
(i.e. link) is characterized by its own values of both MTBF
and MTTR, which are commonly independent from other
components in the network. As a consequence of lacking real
data, some metrics (such as cable length and CC) can be
alternatively used for measuring the two availability metrics.
According to [33], MTBF can be calculated as follows:
MTBF(hours) =
CC × 365 × 24
Cable Length
(3)
5For instance, when CC is equal to 100 km, it means that per
100 km there will be on average one cut per year. Besides this,
the MTTR of a link is influenced by its length [34], which
expresses the fact that the longer link has a higher MTTR
value. On this basis, we have designed the following formula
for calculating the MTTR value for each link in the network.
MTTR(hours) = γ × CableLength (4)
Where γ is defined as a parameter indicating the time
required to fix the cable, which is measured by hour/kilometer
format. Due to the fact that links are physically distributed in
different locations and environments, therefore, γ differs from
one link to another. In other words, even if some links have
the same length, their γ could be different as it relies on the
physical location and the ambient conditions. We will discuss
the use of these two values in Section VI.
V. RISK ANALYSIS
According to [35], risk can be defined in terms of the
following three questions: What scenario could occur? what
is the likelihood that scenario would occur? and what is the
consequence if the scenario does occur? We next consider
these questions towards formulating failure risk in SDNs.
What scenario could occur? We define the scenario as
any undesirable event, such as failure, that breaks the service
down and therefore requires a solution (e.g. path change).
According to [36], there are three main types of failure
scenarios, namely controller failure (including hardware and
software), communication components failure (i.e. node and
link) and application failure (e.g. bugs in application code),
that could affect the SDN networking system. We define the set
of all scenarios as S ranged over by variables s1, s2, . . . , sn ∈ S.
What is the likelihood a scenario would occur? The like-
lihood that a failure scenario disrupts the network services is
conditional on the occurrence of the scenario. We address this
question by the aid of online failure prediction that in our case
works based on a scenario’s failure probability, p ∈ [0, 1].
What is the consequence if the scenario does occur? We
address this question by computing the percentage of loss or
consequence, c, that might potentially happen when a failure
scenario is predicted at an early stage. Each failure scenario
might lead to some disconnections and service disruption.
Therefore, the severity of adverse effects of each failure
scenario varies. For instance, c1 that was caused by s1 might
be different from c2 that was caused by s2, which would reflect
the outage costs that would result from disrupting some of the
network connections.
Over a period of time, these questions would make a list of
outcomes in the form of a triplet 〈si, pi, ci〉. Utilising such
information, risk can then be formulated as a set of triples:
Risk = {〈si, pi, ci〉}, i = 1, 2, . . . , n (5)
Failure scenarios may have many causes and different
origins. However, in this paper we focus only on one type,
i.e. link failure scenarios that hit the data plane. Therefore,
because we are considering the only link failure scenarios,
s(ei j ), we shall refine the definition of risk in (5). Accordingly,
we redefine risk of damage to be the combination of the
probability of link failure and its consequence.
Risks(ei j ) = p(ei j ) × c(ei j ) (6)
To deduce the risk value, the two factors of (6), i.e. p and c,
can be assessed independently. On one hand, the probability,
p, depends on the efficacy of the online failure predictor at
determining the likelihood of the incoming failure scenarios,
which is, in this study, defined by a selective failure probability
threshold value, TΩ. On the other hand c can be measured
based upon the percentage of affected routes that would
result from the anticipated scenario. By utilising some global
network topological characteristics, such as Edge Betweenness
Centrality (EBC), the consequence score can be identified. The
edge betweenness centrality of a link ei j is the total number
of shortest paths between pairs of nodes that traverse the edge
ei j [37], which can be formulated as follows:
EBCei j =
∑
vi ∈V
∑
vj ∈V
Γvi,v jei j
Γvi,v j
(7)
Where Γvi,v j denotes the number of shortest paths between
nodes vi and v j, while, Γvi,v jei j denotes the number of shortest
paths between nodes vi and v j and go through ei j ∈ E . For
instance, Figure 3 demonstrates an example topology with
an EBC value for each link in the network, which has been
calculated based on Ulrik Brandes algorithm [38]. The network
1 2
3
4
5
EBCe = 0.4
EBCe = 0.35
EBCe = 0.25EBCe = 0.35
EBCe = 0.25
12
23
24
35
45
Fig. 3. Topology example with different EBC values
controller knows the demand traffic matrix between all pairs
in the network, i.e. Flow. Therefore, equation (7) in our case
is congruent with the following:
EBCei j∈M =
Γ f lowei j
Γ f low
(8)
Where Γ f low denotes the total number of paths in Flow set,
while, Γ f lowei j denotes the number of paths in Flow set and
pass through ei j ∈ M . With the above context in mind, the
higher the EBC value of ei j , which is a normalised value
between 0 and 1, the more critical the link is and therefore, the
higher the score indicating the consequences. This is because
the outcome of failure for a link with high EBC will definitely
lead to a huge number of path failures and therefore a higher
percentage of negative impacts on the availability of network
services. Our goal in this analysis is to gauge the percentage
of possible loss and provide such information to the concerned
decision-making mechanism, i.e. the routing mechanism in our
case. For more details about the existing risk analysis methods
that fit SDNs, we refer the interested readers to [39].
6Fig. 4. Architecture of the proposed framework.
VI. FRAMEWORK DESIGN
From a high level point of view, Figure 4 illustrates the
main components of our proposed framework where the Smart
Routing and Prediction modules are the primary contribution
of our work. We discuss next in more detail the components
we used to develop this framework.
(a) SDN Controller
Our framework currently supports the POX controller [40],
which is an open source SDN controller written in python
and it is more suitable for fast prototyping than other available
controllers such as [41]. The standard OpenFlow protocol is
used for establishing the communication between the data and
control planes, whereas the set of POX APIs can be used for
developing various network control applications.
(b) Smart Routing
Firstly, this module is responsible for maintaining and parsing
the underlying network topology. Topology parameters such
as the number of nodes and links, way of connection and
port status can be detected via the Link Layer Discovery
Protocol (LLDP) [42], which is one of the vital features of
the current OpenFlow specification. The openflow.discovery1,
which is an already developed component that can be used
to send crafted LLDP messages out of OpenFlow nodes so
that the topological view over the data plane layer can be
constructed. This module will then convert the discovered
network topology into a graph G representation for efficient
management purposes. To do so, we utilised the Networkx
tool [43], which is a pure python package with a set of
powerful functions for manipulating network graphs. When
the network starts working and after shaping the data plane
topology, the shortest path for each f low ∈ Flow is configured
by the appointed SPx algorithm, which thereafter is stored
in the Operational Routes table that is specified to contain
1https://github.com/att/pox/blob/master/pox/openflow/discovery.py
all the desired working (healthy) paths. In order to perceive
how the link failure incident could affect the configured paths
from the perspective of service availability and convergence
time, we provide a simple example in Table III in which the
service deterioration of the f lowx due to link failure incident
is highlighted. In order to maintain the Operational Routes
table, two algorithms have been implemented each with its
own view in respect to keep the Flow maintained.
Algorithm 1 depicts the default shortest path routing strat-
egy that is performed by the network controller. We specify
Dijkstra’s algorithm [26], with complexity O(|V |+|E | log |V |),
as the shortest path finder approach for Algorithm 1, which
we denote by SPD instead of SPx . So, the SPD is a Dijkstra
function that can be applied on any f lowset to return only one
unique shortest path. When the OpenFlow controller reports a
link failure event, every path suffering from that failure will
be detected and then two operations will be issued by the
controller. First, a Remove, denoted by OFRemove , command
is sent to all the routers that belong to each failed path in
Flow as a step to remove the incorrectly working entries,
then an alternative route will be computed for every affected
f low. The new flow entries of the alternative path are then
forwarded to the relevant routers of each f low through the
Install, denoted by OF I nst all , command. Each modified f low,
i.e. assigned to alternative, will be stored in a special set that
is called the Labeled Flow (LF), where: LF ⊂ Flow and with
length of n. This is to indicate that each f low ∈ LF is in a
sub-optimal state. The recovery from link failure procedure
is demonstrated in line (1-13). However, the algorithm also
includes the reversion procedure that is activated after a
failure recurs (line 15-32) and it is no less important than the
recovery process [44]. This procedure is required to take into
account the percentage of routing flaps that is necessary for
the experimental analysis. In fact, we developed this algorithm
for comparison purposes only against Algorithm 2. Therefore,
it does not reflect a contribution of this paper.
Algorithm 2 is one of the main contributions of this work
that exploited the prediction information towards enhancing
the service availability and the fault tolerance of SDNs. This
algorithm depends on Bhandari’s algorithm for finding K edge-
disjoint paths [45], which has been utilised as a complemen-
tary to build the smart routing strategy. We denoted Bhandari’s
algorithm as SPB in place of SPx . Thereon, we consider SPB
as a function specified to compute two link-disjoint paths with
the least total cost for any given pair of nodes (i.e. src and
dst) or f lowset . For the purpose of distinguishing between the
two returned paths of SPB , we denote the first path as f lowb1
and the second disjoint one as f lowb2 . The time complexity
of SPB is different from the SPD , which is a polynomial that
is equivalent to O((K + 1).|E |+|V | log |V |).
The pseudo code of Smart Routing (SR) is demonstrated
in Algorithm 2, in which the f lowb1 is initially selected to
represent the primary path for each f low in the network. The
network controller will then start listening to the prediction
module, which will be discussed in the next section, for
the potential of future incidents. When a new message (m)
is received, the controller will firstly identify the potential
failed list, which contains the information about link which
7TABLE III
SERVICE AVAILABILITY AND NETWORK FLOWS RELATION
Event Flow src → dst accessibility TC Serviceability Notes
– f lowx Yes – 4 Path is working
f lowx ∈ FR f lowx No TD 6 Path is not working
f lowx ∈ FR f lowx No TSP 6 Search for alternatives
f lowx ∈ FR f lowx No TUpdate 6 Path is restoring
– f lowx Yes – 4 Path is restored
Algorithm 1: Shortest Path Routing
On Normal: ∀ f low ∈ Flow : Set Primary Path as flow . f low ∈
SPD ( f lowset )
On Failure : Do the following procedure
1 if Link failure reported then
2 foreach ei j ∈ F do
3 Compute: FR
4 end
5 do
6 OFRemove ( f low)
7 f lowset := f lowset − { f low }
8 f low := SPD ( f lowset )
9 OF I nst all ( f low)
10 LF ← f low
11 FR := FR − { f low }
12 while FR 6= ∅;
13 end
14 c := 0
15 if Link repair reported then
16 do
17 if f lowc is currently optimal then
18 Do nothing
19 c := c + 1
20 end
21 if f lowc is currently sub-optimal then
22 OFRemove ( f lowc )
23 f lowc := SPD ( f lowcset )
24 OF I nst all ( f lowc )
25 LF := LF − { f lowc }
26 c := c + 1
27 end
28 if number of links = Elen then
29 LF := empty
30 end
31 while c 6 LFlen ;
32 end
is expected to fail in the near future as described in (line 2-
4). Secondly, the route (or routes) which might be affected
according to the predicted failure message will be computed as
a preparatory step to replace them (lines 5-7). After identifying
the routes that may possibly fail, the EBC for the predicted
link will be calculated as a step towards measuring the risk
(lines 8-10). If the risk value is below the threshold, then
the prediction information will be ignored and no action will
be taken. Otherwise, the flow entries of the newly computed
disjoint path from the second step will be installed through
using the Install command. This is done by adjusting the
disjoint path rules with lower priority than the primary path
to avoid conflict of matching and action processes.
Following this step, the forwarding rules of the risky pri-
mary paths will need to be deleted in order to use TCAM
resources efficiently. This needs to be done in a similar
procedure to the installation but with the Remove command
as demonstrated in (lines 11-14). After swapping the primary,
f lowb1 , with the disjoint, f lowb2 , this action will be consid-
ered as the correct decision for a certain period of time (i.e.
∆tp) as indicated in line 15. To examine the substantiality of
the changing routes decision, the link that was anticipated to
Algorithm 2: Smart Routing
Input : Network topology G(V, E), M
Output: PFR ≈ ∅
1 ∀ f low ∈ Flow : Set Primary Path as f lowb1 . f lowb1 ∈ SPB ( f lowset )
2 if M = {m} then
3 PFL ← e¯i j
4 end
5 foreach e¯i j ∈ PFL do
6 Compute: PFR
7 end
8 EBCe¯i j =
PFRlen
Flowlen
9 Riske¯i j = p(e¯i j ) × EBCe¯i j
10 if Risk ¯ei j > RiskTω then
11 do
12 OF I nst all ( f lowb2 . f lowb2 ∈ SPB ( f lowset ))
13 OFRemove ( f lowb1 . f lowb1 ∈ SPB ( f lowset ))
14 while PFR 6= ∅;
15 Wait: ∆tp
16 if e¯i j ∈ F then
17 Mark as: TP
18 LF ← PFR
19 else
20 Mark as: FP
21 do
22 OF I nst all ( f lowb1 . f lowb1 ∈ SPB ( f lowset ))
23 OFRemove ( f lowb2 . f lowb2 ∈ SPB ( f lowset ))
24 while PFR 6= ∅;
25 end
26 end
27 PFR = ∅
28 if
[ F = (ei j )∧(ei j /∈ M) ] ∨ [ F = (ei j ) ∧ (ei j ∈ M)∧(Risk ¯ei j < RiskTω ) ]
then
29 Mark as: FN
30 Call Algorithm1
31 end
32 if Link repair reported then
33 Call Algorithm1
34 end
get down within ∆tl will be compared against the failure set
F. On one hand, if the link exists then, the prediction will be
marked as TP. In addition, each f low ∈ PFR will be labeled
as sub-optimal and store in LF (lines 16-18). On the other
hand, if the link does not exist then, the prediction will be
considered as FP. In such a case, it is necessary to reset the
primary path to its initial state (i.e. optimal) as deliberated in
(lines 19-25). However, in case when there is a failure that is
not captured by the prediction module then, it is considered
as FN and such failures are tackled by calling Algorithm 1
as outlined in (line 28-30). Finally, Algorithm 1 will also be
invoked when a failed link is repaired (lines 32-34).
(c) Prediction Module
In this work, this module is placed on top of the parsed
network topology state that gained from the network controller
as a result of lacking historical data. We consider each link
in the network as an independent object of link class. The
link class contains a set of attributes, which currently includes
eight attributes as shown in Figure 5.
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Fig. 5. Representation of links in priority queue
The link attributes are used to control the up and down
events. In the current implementation, we used the priority
queue, Q, as a pool to hold all the non-faulty links. On one
hand, equations (3) and (4) are essential for computing the
two static attributes (MTBF and MTTR) of each link. For
(3), we rely on the topologies information in Section VII-C
and by assuming that CC equals the minimum cable length
in a network. While, for (4) we used the uniform distribution
to generate γ for each link independently. On the other hand,
the six remaining attributes are described as follows:
• ID: a numerical unique value (i.e. 1, . . . , n) assigned to the
link to represent the link identification number.
• F Count: registers the number of times the link has failed.
• Length: represents the link’s length in km, which is derived
from the topology specification.
• Next F : refers to the next time to failure of link, which
controls the enqueue and dequeue operations of the link. In
other words, this attribute determines the link’s life span in
the Q, where the link will be dequeued when Next F=0.
• Probability F : registers the current failure probability, p,
of the link. For instance, the Probability F of the link ( j) is
defined as:
F Count(ID j )∑n
i=1 F Count(IDi )
× 100
where n is the Q length.
• Status : reflects the current state of the link as either
operational or faulty.
On this basis, we have placed our online predictor scheme,
as defined by Algorithm 3, on top of the priority queue in
order to send encapsulated messages about the links which
satisfy the following two conditions (as described in lines 2-
9): First, the probability of failure is greater than or equal to
the threshold TΩ and second, the leading time (i.e. ∆tl) is less
than or equal to the next time to failure.
VII. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP AND DESIGN
Since smart routing is aimed to enhance the SDN fault
tolerance in the context of network service availability, we
have implemented some metrics for fair comparison between
the traditional SDN and the proposed system. We also show
in this section the adopted network topologies that have been
utilised in our experiments.
A. Availability Measurements
Considering the convergence time that is required to shift
from a failed or non-operational path to an alternative or
Algorithm 3: Alarm message generator (M)
Input : G(V, E)
Output: M
1 while (Q! = ∅) do
2 if Probability F(Qptr ) > TΩ then
3 Compute: ∆tl
4 if Next F(Qptr ) > ∆tl then
5 Wait: Next F(Qptr ) − ∆tl
6 Generate: (m, e¯i j(Qptr ) )
7 else
8 ∆tl is not satisfied
9 end
10 else
11 Do nothing
12 end
13 Wait: Next F(Qptr ) = 0
14 end
backup one, which conforms with Equation (1). This con-
vergence process definitely damages the availability of some
paths, as shown in Table III. For the purpose of identifying
the serviceable, which are denoted by ”Yes”, and the unser-
viceable, which are denoted by ”No”, f lows with respect to
some failure events, we formulated this problem as follows:
( f low ∩Q) = f low =⇒ Yes
( f low ∩Q) ⊂ f low =⇒ No
where, ”Yes” and ”No” can be obtained by intersecting each
f low ∈ Flow against the Q. The f low is subjected to ”Yes”
when all its forming edges reside in the Q, otherwise, the f low
will be considered as unserviceable and subjected to “No”. By
knowing the number of serviceable and unserviceable f lows,
the service unavailability and thus the service availability can
be measured. The service unavailability of SDN (USDN ) over
a given interval time with a certain number of failure events,
which are denoted by ev, can be arrived at as follows:
USDN (Flow,G) =
ev∑
i=1
f low∈FlowNo
ev × Flowlen (9)
Whereas, for smart routing it is important to further consider
the impact of Recall values as well. Hence, the service
unavailability of SR (USR) can be arrived at through the
following equation:
USR(Flow,G) = (1 − Recall) × (USDN (Flow,G)) (10)
Consequently, the availability Ax , with x = SDN or SR, can
be arrived at through the following:
Ax = 1 −Ux (11)
B. Routing Instability Measurements
In traditional networks, routing protocols (e.g. IGP [46])
perform two routing changes as a reaction to every single
failure, one time when a failure occurs and another when
a failure is repaired. In fact, both changes are essential for
the QoS where the first change is for the purpose of service
availability, while, the goal of the second one is to return
back from the backup (i.e. sub-optimal) to the primary (i.e.
optimal) path again. In contrast, SDN architecture brings
9centralisation and programmability to the scene, therefore,
traditional distributed protocols are independent of the SDN
architecture. Maintaining the optimal path (e.g. minimum hops
in our case) of each f low will require a continuously adaptive
strategy that will be responsible for replacing each sub-optimal
f low with the optimal one after it becomes serviceable. To do
so, we assume that each alternative f low is additionally stored
in LF as mentioned in Section VI. For SDN, the routing flaps
(denoted by RF) can be measured by the means of link up
(denoted by u f ) and down (denoted by df ) as follows:
RFSDN =
∑
f low∈LF
u f +
∑
f low∈FR
df (12)
On one hand, and according to (12), after each link down
event; a new route for each f low ∈ FR is required, which
then leads to a first routing change for each f low. On the
other hand, and after each link up announcement, the controller
will need to check the state of each labeled f low in LF to
determine if it’s still the optimal choice. If so, then no change
will be made, otherwise, rerouting is required and therefore it
will result in another routing change.
However, for the smart routing mechanism, it is necessary
to consider the three prediction parameters also (i.e. FN,TP
and FP) as follows:
RFSR =
∑
f low∈FR
FN f +
∑
f low∈PFR
TP f +
∑
f low∈PFR
FP f +
∑
f low∈LF
u f
(13)
According to (13), the FN f is equivalent to df in (12) as
it reflects the actual failure events that have not been captured
by the prediction module, while the remaining are as follows:
• Each true prediction will lead to a first reroute flap that
gives the advantage of avoiding an upcoming failure event.
While, the second flap will be similar to the scenario of RFSDN
through inserting the f low into the LF and the next flap builds
upon the link restoration u f .
• Each false prediction leads into two useless flaps, one when
the prediction triggers an alarm, in such a case each potential
f low will be added to the temporary labeled Flow set (TLF),
as a transient step before it recognises the prediction was false.
The second flap is performed when ∆tp expires.
We provide an overview of the process of measuring the
number of routing flaps in the flow chart of Figure 6, which
also shows how the LF is adjusted in the scenario of the two
algorithms, i.e. Algorithm 1 and 2.
Since all actions are associated with the link state, in this
work, we utilise the OpenFlow protocol to reflect the data
plane links changing state by relying on the Link-State Adver-
tisement (LSA), in addition to the proposed prediction module
that will also produce additional observed information about
the potential failures. Both LSA and prediction information
will be delivered to the controller through the Updater in order
to apply the appropriate action as illustrated in the flow chart.
C. Simulated network topologies
In order to evaluate the proposed method, we have modelled
three core network topologies as illustrated in Table IV, where
Updater
Network Controller
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Link State 
  Call Algorithm 
1 
Down
Up
Current= 1
Evaluate  
 flowCurrent ∈ LF 
Is it 
optimal?
No
Rules update
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If  
Current < n
   Re-evaluate 
flowCurrent
Finish No
  Call Algorithm 
2
Potential
Remove  flowCurrent  
from LF
Add 
the fixed flow into 
LF
Yes
Add 
the fixed flow into 
TLF
Wait  ∆tp
Check
prediction
TP
FP
   Re-evaluate
 the flow 
Remove
from TLF
Info.
LSA
Remove
from TLF
Yes
Fig. 6. Flow chart of routing flaps
both janos-us and germany50 represent a real network topol-
ogy instance that was defined in [47], while waxman synthetic
topology is created by the Internet topology generator Brite
[48] through using the well-known Waxman model [49].
TABLE IV
TOPOLOGIES’ CHARACTERISTICS
Topology Nodes Edges Minlen(ei j ) Maxlen(ei j )
janos-us 26 42 145 km 1127 km
germany50 50 88 36 km 236 km
waxman 70 140 15 km 1099 km
Waxman’s model is a geographical approach that connects
distributed routers in a plane on the basis of the distance
among them, given by the following probabilistic formula:
P({vi, vj}) = β exp
−d(vi ,vj )
Lα (14)
where 0 < α and β ≤ 1. d represents the distance between
vi and vj , while L represents the maximum distance between
any two given nodes. The number of links among the gen-
erated nodes is associated with the value of α in a directly
proportional manner, while the edge distance increases when
the value of β is incremented. We used Brite to generate a
large-scale network topology in comparison to the others (e.g.
when the number of edges or nodes ≥ 100). The characteristics
of all the modelled topologies are detailed in Table IV.
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D. Experimental Design and Implementation
In order to validate our approach, the proposed framework
is built-up on top of POX controller2. We evaluated our
framework prototype by using the container-based emulator,
Mininet [50]. Mininet is a widely used emulation system,
as evidenced in a recent survey [10], for evaluating and
prototyping SDN protocols and applications. It can also be
used to create realistic virtual networks, running real kernel,
switch and application code, on a single machine (VM, cloud
or native). Our experiments were designed based on the
topologies that we illustrated in the preceding section. Since
one of our experimental topologies was designed via Brite,
we utilised the Fast Network Simulation Setup (FNSS) [51].
FNSS is a python-based toolchain simulator that can be used
to facilitate the process of network experiments. It provides
a wide range of functions and adapters that allow network
researchers to parse graphs from different topology generators,
such as Brite, in order to be compatible with and/or to interface
with other simulator/emulator tools, such as Mininet.
Based on the failure event model (Section IV-B), the general
reliability theory [52] has been utilised to generate failure
events using the exponential distribution (mean = MTBF)
for the next time to failure of each link, and lognormal
distribution E(µ, σ) with:
µ = log(MTTR) − ((0.5) × log(1 + ((0.6 ×MTTR)2/MTTR2)))
and,
σ =
√
log(1 + ((0.6 × MTTR)2/MTTR2
for time to recover. Regarding failure anticipation, false and
true positive have been generated during the simulated time
using the uniform distribution following the specified threshold
value. Figure 7 summarises the simulated link queuing system
that is correlated to the two metrics of reliability, i.e. MTBF
and MTTR.
                       eij . . .
1
eijnQ
Next_F = 0
Link Down
Qptr
Increment
F_Count
Compute time
to recover
  Wait till
time to recover 
Compute new 
Next_F 
Put  eij 
back into Q
Fig. 7. Flow diagram of a link’s life cycle in the Queue
In order to dispatch the prediction information that is nec-
essarily important to the smart routing module, the distributed
messages framework (ZeroMQ [53]) was exploited to carry
the alarm messages, M , from the prediction module to the
network controller interface. In some network f low conditions
it will activate the smart routing module to begin a possible
reconfiguration. In the emulation environment, we employed
2The implementation code of the current framework is made available on
github : https://github.com/Ali00/SDN-Prediction-Model.
two servers; one acts as the OpenFlow controller and the
other to simulate the network topologies. For each server, we
used Ubuntu version 14.04 LTS running on an Intel Core-i5
processor equipped with 8 GB RAM.
VIII. KEY ADVANTAGES OF SMART ROUTING
In this section, we present comparison and evaluation of the
proposed method versus the default SDN technique. To do so,
the study has been conducted on the three topologies that were
summarised in Table IV. To simulate the three topologies, we
ran the emulator for 144 hours, i.e. each experimental topology
was simulated in the system for 48 hours. Figure 8 shows the
obtained results from the three topologies based on parameter
settings of TΩ = 0.25, Tω = 0.1, ∆tl = 120s and ∆tp = 30s.
As discussed earlier, the TΩ and Tω values can be selected
by the network operator or by using additional algorithms (i.e.
machine learning) to identify the near optimal values. Since the
main goal of smart routing is to enhance the network service
availability, we plot for each network that which gives the
default SDN and SR mechanisms for the service availability
percentage (Y-axis) and the rate of routing flaps (X-axis).
Furthermore, for SR, the performance of the online failure
predictor represented by the values of Recall and Precision are
considered and reported respectively to each topology. In fact,
Recall value has a crucial impact on the service availability
in the SR scheme, however, Precision value has an impact on
the unnecessary routing changes. It can be clearly observed
that SR outperformed the default SDN in providing network
service availability for all test cases. In spite of the low Recall
values (i.e. 0.2-0.3), there is still a gain in service availability.
Similarly, janos-us gained the highest improvement percentage
in the service availability and this is because its Recall value
is greater than that of the other topologies.
On the other hand, the rate of the routing flaps generated by
SR is always higher than the SDN. This disadvantage comes
as a trade-off for improving the network service availability.
Given that the routing instability by means of unnecessary
flaps is correlated with the value Precision, we have measured
the only useless flaps that were generated during the simulation
time and for each topology as shown in Figure 9. Figure 9(a)
shows the only unnecessary routing changes that have been
reported based on the FP rate of each topology, where each
single FP is associated with two useless flaps, that is, one for
the reconfiguration and the other for the reversion. However,
Figure 9(b) shows the percentage of useless routing flaps for
each topology in comparison with the total number of flaps. In
the worst case scenario the routing flaps did not exceed 25%.
Although janos-us topology has the highest Precision value, it
yielded a relatively high percentage of useless flaps and this is
because the number of links in the topology is low, hence, it
is highly likely that each single link is associated with a large
number of routes in contrast to the other two topologies. It is
also clearly evident that the online failure prediction plays a
significant role in both service availability (by TP) and routing
flaps (by FP). Based upon the experiments and simulations,
we have some observations, as follows:
• Some alternative routes are considered as optimal after
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Fig. 9. Routing instability measurements
receiving an updater message, even though the received update
is not involved in its conforming path. The reason for this is
that the current system defines the optimal path based on the
number of hops. Therefore, each alternative path that has the
same number of hops as the optimal one will be considered
to be an optimal path. It might not be the case if the obtained
mechanism, i.e. using a specified cost function with different
parameters such as bandwidth, congestion, energy, etc., is not
relying on the number of hops.
• In some cases the algorithm is barely able to find two-
disjoint paths and therefore, sometimes if a path has faced
two successive predictions on its links then, no change will
be made. Hence, we used (≈) instead of (=) in the output of
Algorithm 2, to imply that an entirely empty PFR cannot be
always guaranteed.
• It is also possible that each f low ∈ LF may face one or
more risky links, thus in such a case the entangled f low state
will be the same (i.e. sub-optimal).
• In some cases and when the Next F < 2 min, the controller
ignores the prediction if it is generated as in such a case the
∆tl is not satisfied and so the controller will not have enough
time for the preparation process.
IX. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper has demonstrated how to use online failure
prediction to enhance SDN service availability. We presented
a new model for SDNs that tackles the problem of data plane
link failures. Our work differs from the existing contributions
by allowing SDN controllers to have a time window to
reconfigure the network before the anticipated failure occurs
and avoid the interruption in the availability of network
services. The proposed model was implemented using a couple
of new algorithms that extract the risky links from paths.
Hence, when such risky links fail, no path will be affected.
Our experiments were performed over a number of network
topologies conducted with the link failure event model. The
experimental findings demonstrate the effectiveness of the
proposed method in enhancing the SDN service availability. A
major drawback of this approach is the routing flaps rate that
results from the failure prediction process, which may lead to
network instability, especially when it reaches high rates. For
this purpose, we measured the percentage of the unnecessary
routing changes and in the worst scenario, it was 25%, which
we consider requires improving in future research.
For other future work, we will position the study in the
setting of machine learning algorithms in order to achieve
more flexibility in the decision making process, allowing this
to be gauged against optimal threshold values. We are also
planning to extend this work to consider disaster situations,
which involve multiple link failures.
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